🚀 Are stablecoins shaking the foundations of banks? Jamie Dimon demands "regulation to banking standards," and I see an escalating battle for deposits.

When Jamie Dimon publicly stated that yield-bearing stablecoin companies should be regulated like banks, I wasn't surprised.

What's truly noteworthy isn't the regulation itself, but the point he made:

Stablecoins have begun to threaten the deposit base of traditional banks.

This isn't an emotional judgment; it's a structural change.

If a product can handle payments, clearing, cross-border transfers on-chain, and also offer yields higher than traditional demand deposits, then capital will naturally reprice its destination.

Behind this lies a direct confrontation between the banking system and on-chain finance.

Jamie Dimon's logic is clear:

Since yield-bearing stablecoins are functionally close to "deposits," they should bear bank-level responsibilities:

Reserve requirements

Deposit insurance

Anti-money laundering compliance

Regular audits

The recent stance of the European Central Bank also points to the same thing—stablecoins may weaken the stability of the liability side of banks.

I understand their concerns.

The banking business model is built on "low-cost deposits."

Once deposits start migrating to on-chain instruments, banks' funding costs will rise, profit structures will be compressed, and lending capacity will be affected.

This isn't a technical issue; it's a balance sheet issue.

But the other side is equally clear.

The reason stablecoins are widely adopted isn't due to narratives, but efficiency:

Lower costs

Faster settlement

More convenient cross-border transactions

More transparent on-chain flows

When the market chooses more efficient products, the role of regulation should be to control risks, not to build moats for the old system.

The core variable I'm more focused on is:

Will future regulation be "risk equivalence" or "identity equivalence"?

If it's risk equivalence, then as long as stablecoins meet standards in asset transparency, reserve structure, and audit intensity, they should have room to exist.

If it's identity equivalence—just because they challenge banks, they must be forced into the banking framework—then the boundaries of innovation will be significantly narrowed.

This game won't end soon.

Banks won't easily give up their deposit base.

On-chain finance won't voluntarily retreat to the experimental stage either.

What I see isn't a simple regulatory dispute, but a long-term structural competition over "who controls the future gateway to money."

What truly decides the outcome isn't sentiment, but where capital ultimately flows.