Despite the fact that $ Unity Software.US's performance is still a mess, there have been continuous operational moves over the past six months: leadership changes, layoffs, and business closures. With these drastic adjustments, the market is also looking forward to the birth of a new Unity or a comeback.

Therefore, 2025 is seen as an important turning point for Unity. The management has repeatedly revealed that the optimization of the underlying model is progressing smoothly, which has increased market expectations, only lacking "performance." Referring to the trends of Applovin in the past two years, bullish funds need to see clear results in performance or operations for at least two consecutive quarters before making a real bet. But at present, we can only try to use $ AppLovin.US as a valuation anchor, predicting Unity's chances of a turnaround based on Applovin's successful experience.

So, what does Unity currently resemble in terms of Applovin? Optimists certainly think of Applovin in 2022, as following the same pattern would mean that performance and stock prices are about to soar. However, the Dolphin believes that compared to Applovin in 2022, Unity still has many shortcomings and is more like Applovin in 2020. Nevertheless, Unity also has some relative advantages that could lead to a quicker "turnaround" in the future.

However, fully benchmarking against Applovin at this moment inevitably brings a sense of instability, so the Dolphin has calculated the potential from different expectation angles. Of course, whether we can achieve our goals later will depend on Unity's actions. The Dolphin's space calculation is more about giving everyone a clearer understanding of the expectations associated with Unity at different positions. Especially if it truly becomes a Meme stock benchmark in the future, it will at least provide a clearer understanding of the risk-reward ratio.

1. What does Unity lack compared to Applovin in 2022?

In the previous Applovin research, the Dolphin focused on discussing Applovin's winning formula, summarizing that the core elements are two: 1) data; 2) ecosystem. So does Unity currently possess these two treasures?

1. Data

The relatively exclusive 1P game data, whether obtained through 200 self-operated games or through the acquisition of Adjust to gain authorized data from app developers, is a key factor that helps Applovin fill the user data gap under ATT 1.1 "Disruptor" Apple ATT

Since Apple's ATT is an important watershed that has widened the gap between peers for Applovin, Dolphin Jun will elaborate a bit.

Before the ATT policy, app developers generally tracked user behavior data through IDFA (Identifier for Advertisers), including cross-app usage data. However, starting with iOS 14 in 2021, the ATT policy requires developers to obtain user authorization to use IDFA.

Surveys show that 95% of users indicated they would not agree to authorization. This severely impacted developers' ability to assess the effectiveness of ad placements and limited the business development of third-party advertising platforms.

However, Apple opened a door by launching an official advertising effectiveness assessment solution—SKAdNetwork (SKAN). This means that advertising platforms can obtain anonymized attribution data (ad reach and conversion data, including SKAN configuration ID, ad ID, conversion value, and timestamp) by configuring SKAN, as well as advertising effectiveness data sent periodically by Apple, without exposing user identity or identification information.

However, in the above process, the data and effect analysis that advertising platforms can obtain is still discounted compared to before:

(1) Attribution data needs to wait 24 hours after the actual conversion (user clicks on the ad and downloads from the App Store) to be received, whereas previously real-time feedback was possible.

(2) The attribution data provided by SKAN is relatively limited, only offering aggregated ad reach and conversion data, with no specific user information at all, which increases the difficulty for advertising platforms to optimize ad placement effectiveness.

The issue of delayed feedback in the first point can be analyzed in advance by those with certain data analysis capabilities through the attribution data received after a 24-hour delay, but those without data analysis capabilities can only wait for Apple's periodic reports. However, the second point, data deficiency, is difficult to compensate for through technology, so how to obtain more detailed user data from other sources naturally becomes a key factor for various advertising platforms to repair advertising effectiveness.

This has also led to smaller advertising platforms with less user behavior data losing more clients as the impact of ATT on advertising effectiveness deepens. Most of the lost advertisers have shifted to leading platforms Meta and Google—these leading platforms have their own traffic and thus possess a large amount of user behavior data, coupled with top-notch algorithm capabilities, which will first alleviate the impact of ATT.

1.2 Unity also has certain data advantages

Applovin has quickly grown in the cracks of giants by relying on 1P game operations and Adjust developer authorization to obtain user data intercepted by the ATT policy. So, does Unity have the ability to fill this data gap? (1) First of all, Unity does not operate first-party games, and Dolphin expects that it will not get involved in the future either.

This is mainly due to Unity's other core business - the game development engine, which is a tool in the game development process. If Unity were to develop/operate games itself, how would small and medium developers eliminate the risk of core gameplay being imitated or plagiarized? This principle of "not competing directly with customers" was established early in Unity's development.

Not getting involved in games does not mean there is no first-party data at all. Unity's acquisition of IronSource's SuperSonic has been engaged in game publishing for many years. By the time of its acquisition in 2022, the games published by SuperSonic had accumulated 2 billion downloads (including multiple version updates of a single game), with 80,000 game apps effectively monetized through Sonic.

Like Applovin's self-operated games, SuperSonic's published games are mostly casual games. However, the difference is that the studios connected to Sonic are smaller, so the games it primarily publishes are more "hyper-casual."

(2) Secondly, Unity does not have a globally top advertising attribution platform like Adjust to analyze user data. In addition to Adjust, AppsFlyer, as the world's leading advertising attribution platform, is currently not affiliated with any advertising platform.

However, there is still hope, as Unity's other core business, the game development engine, is deeply involved in the development process and has a lot of interaction with developers. In addition to obtaining in-app user data authorization from developers who use services directly related to advertising commercialization like Unity Ads, for developers who do not use Unity Ads services, Unity can also obtain user data authorization from developers by focusing on providing game performance and player behavior analysis software - Unity Analytics.

Unity Analytics avoids policies related to user privacy such as COPPA or GDPR by generating an anonymous ID for each player. Whether developers collect user data in-app is compliant is not something Unity needs to consider (if users have objections, they can simply cancel data collection in the app).

In Dolphin's view, the way Unity Analytics collects user data is essentially similar to Adjust. But there are also drawbacks; the user data collected by Unity Analytics does not include user feedback effects from advertising placements. Adjust itself is used to analyze advertising effectiveness, and it requires authorization from developers for almost all data Therefore, for Unity, it still needs to find ways to supplement the analysis and processing of how user behavior data can be converted into advertising effectiveness data. However, this approach is certainly much better than having no specific user data at all and relying solely on the aggregated data provided by Apple's official SKAN, which leads to a blind analysis.

In addition, Unity also mentioned obtaining data through social platforms, partnerships, and third-party advertising intermediaries, as well as directly obtaining user information authorization through some user incentive interactive activities.

In summary, the two main ways for Unity to supplement user data after ATT are self-acquired technical tools (developer authorization) and external platform sharing. However, Dolphin has always believed that for Unity, which has deep roots in the gaming industry for many years, there is no shortage of understanding of the industry or usable user data. What is lacking is the failure to face the impact of ATT over the past three years and the inability to analyze and utilize user data in a timely manner to mitigate the impact.

Compared to 2022 and even the current Applovin, Unity does have relative advantages—user data from more than a dozen device versions, including consoles, PCs, VR, and other devices. This is particularly beneficial for game developers' increasing demand for cross-platform releases. If there are improvements in advertising tracking and user positioning technology, Unity has additional room for development.

2. Full Industry Chain Layout and Closed-loop Ecosystem

In addition to data, Applovin has another "winning weapon" in its full industry chain layout—from customer acquisition to monetization, providing end-to-end services, as well as a closed-loop ecosystem—where different businesses are tightly integrated within the ecosystem.

The full industry chain layout was an advantage Applovin had in 2022. After gaining scale advantages, especially in the advertising inventory scale advantage of application developers, Applovin had the opportunity to actively absorb third-party DSP platforms/ad networks, thus gaining a relative advantage in some bidding information.

So how is Unity's business layout and ecosystem?

Before acquiring IronSource, Unity's product advantages were more focused on the game development and operational support side. Although there were corresponding tools and platforms for developers' advertising monetization (Unity Ads and Monetize), the addition of IronSource starting in 2023 undoubtedly enriched Unity's advertising ecosystem layout.

However, the problem is that the aforementioned industry chain layout was the "blueprint" announced when the merger with IS was first announced in 2022. In reality, Unity quickly fell into a chaotic period from 2022 to 2024. The biggest change during this period was the change in leadership (as of December 2024, the new management team, including the CEO, CFO, CTO, and head of Grow business, has all been in place).

Therefore, the original business landscape has naturally undergone significant changes, especially with the reduction of some low-profit level businesses. Although the cuts mainly focused on professional consulting services on the development side (Professional Services) and high-priced technologies like Weta, there were also certain sacrifices made on the advertising monetization side due to the need to survive For example, IronSource's acquisition of Luna in 2021 (a platform that provides automated ad creation and cross-platform marketing campaign management) has not yet played a significant role and was shut down in early 2024.

Source: Unity IR official website (the image is from the 2022 version, with the red cross indicating that the business was subsequently adjusted and abandoned)

So what are the differences in the industrial chain layout between Unity and Applovin? Dolphin has compared the products of both based on various aspects of the mobile application industrial chain:

From the above image, it can be seen that the differences in the ecological layout between Unity and Applovin mainly lie in:

In the core aspect of the industrial chain—advertising intermediary role, Unity does not have its own DSP platform (mainly connecting to external platforms), meaning it does not provide services for advertisers to quote on platforms.

Lack of specialized advertising creation and other auxiliary tools.

Differences in analytical tools (discussed above), and the service connecting to CTV channels is limited by the audience scope in game content, making its scale smaller than Applovin's Wurl.

Among these three points, the first point has the greatest impact. The most obvious benefit of having its own DSP is the ability to collect advertising demand more and faster, understand the advertising goals of advertisers for better optimal price matching, and to share more profits by shortening the industrial chain.

From an ecological perspective, a full industrial chain layout can keep the entire operational process of developers from customer acquisition to monetization within the Applovin platform, allowing developers to meet their various operational needs without relying on external platforms. Being closer to both buyers and sellers also means that the data will be more detailed, which is beneficial for optimizing the underlying recommendation model.

For Unity, which lacks its own DSP, the aforementioned ecological closed loop is naturally not as smooth as Applovin's. Through the comparison of the two platforms, Dolphin's overall feeling is that until this year, Unity's strategic positioning for mobile marketing business was merely seen as a side extension of its engine business, and it did not regard it as a business that needed to develop independently and robustly.

Therefore, whether it is the lack of a DSP platform or the absence of some auxiliary tools, and the audience being limited to game advertisers, all reflect insufficient strategic positioning. Similarly, due to the lack of emphasis, Unity has not realized the greater risks brought by the gaps in industrial chain layout when facing the impact of ATT. In contrast, Applovin, because mobile marketing is its main business, places much higher importance on it, which is why it timely completed its industrial chain layout through two acquisitions in 2021, alleviating some of the impacts of ATT. **

Since the leadership change that began at the end of 2023, although there has been restructuring and adjustments throughout the year, at least currently, Unity has not yet filled the gap in its industrial chain ecological layout, which will depend on the management's subsequent new actions.

In summary, in terms of the winning formula—"data + ecological layout," it must be said that Unity still has some shortcomings compared to Applovin in 2022. However, the foreseeable improvement is—optimizing existing advertising tracking and measurement technology through the relatively abundant user data at hand, and enhancing the user reach and conversion rate of advertisements. This is an important task for Unity during its two years of chaos.

II. Value Comparison: Can Unity's Future Benchmark Applovin?

From the previous analysis, although the results are not exciting, at least Dolphin understands the key reasons for Unity Grow's underperformance, thus providing a clearer path for Unity's turnaround.

So, under different hypothetical expectations, if we pessimistically assume that Unity Grow's problems remain unchanged and the engine business is mediocre, and optimistically assume that Grow can fix its issues, what are the respective prospects for Unity?

Since the extent to which Unity Grow can recover is closely related to industry competition, let's first discuss the industry.

1. Industry

To understand the industry, we cannot avoid discussing games (mainly mobile games), as the source of funding for the industry chain, regardless of how profits are divided, is the game application developers. Although Applovin has also ventured into the non-gaming tool application field and hopes to secure a place in the e-commerce sector, currently, games are equally important for both Applovin and Unity.

So what is the development trend of the mobile game market? Overall, this year will continue to recover, with mini-games expected to bring in new growth, and the proportion of IAA continuing to rise significantly.

Before the pandemic, in the mobile gaming industry, in-app purchases (IAP) accounted for over 70% of the mainstream, but with casual games shining during the pandemic and retail ads filling part of the in-game ad inventory, the monetization revenue share of in-app ads (IAA) has rapidly increased.

According to data from Statista and Sensor Tower, the estimated IAA revenue in 2023 has reached 85% of IAP revenue. Although IAP is expected to gradually recover and grow in 2024, casual games in the form of mini-games are making a comeback (such as WeChat and Douyin in China, and Facebook overseas). In addition, more game developers are beginning to favor IAA as a monetization method, as IAA can help game developers expand their reach to more low-paying players and compensate for the value gap in payments through advertising Therefore, Dolphin Jun expects that in the next two years, the game market will still be a period where the proportion of IAA will increase rapidly, meaning it will achieve growth at a rate higher than that of IAP.

2. Company Operations

Due to the impact of the company's own differences, in addition to the business differences mentioned earlier (data & ecosystem), what gaps exist in the operational capabilities of Unity compared to Applovin?

2.1 Does the management value shareholder interests?

In Dolphin Jun's view, the actions of Unity's old management team reflect a very unreliable attitude towards the importance of shareholder interests and understanding customer needs. The neglect of customer needs is mainly reflected in the introduction of the "Run-time" charging model, which Dolphin Jun has discussed multiple times in financial report comments. Here, we mainly talk about how Unity's past management has underestimated and harmed shareholder interests.

(1) Acquisitions

As a software company, it is common for companies to acquire external technologies and resources through mergers and acquisitions as they expand. Unity and Applovin have also made several external acquisitions in their development history.

Whether the market recognizes the acquisition itself depends on the acquisition price and method, as well as the subsequent integration effects. However, the biggest problem with Unity's acquisitions in recent years is that the chosen acquisition methods have almost always been paid for by minority shareholders.

For example, Unity's acquisition of ironSource strategically mimics Applovin's acquisition of Mopub. However, there are significant differences in acquisition price and method between the two platforms:

a. Acquisition Price: Unity's Premium is Higher

The acquisition price for ironSource is $4.4 billion, with a static valuation of EV/Non-EBITDA=23x and EV/Sales=8x, which is higher than the valuation of EV/Sales=10/1.88=5x that Applovin paid $1 billion for Mopub during a better market sentiment in 2021 (in 2020, Mopub contributed $188 million to Twitter).

b. Acquisition Method: Unity Stock Swap vs. Applovin Cash

Additionally, Unity's acquisition of IS was done through a stock swap, without spending a penny in cash, while also issuing a high-conversion-price $1 billion convertible bond, which doubles the harm to minority shareholders. In contrast, Applovin's acquisition of Mopub was done entirely in cash, which almost did not cause any valuation loss to minority shareholders.

(2) Equity Incentives

Unity's disregard for shareholder interests is also reflected in its consistently high equity incentive expenses since its IPO. In the same period, even with two equity incentive grants before its two listings, Applovin's overall expense as a proportion of revenue did not exceed 15%

2.1 Is revenue generated by products or sales?

Compared to its peers, Applovin has a very high adjusted EBITDA or cash flow ratio in its advertising business (Software platform):

On one hand, Applovin's advertising revenue is calculated based on net income, so the gross margin of the advertising business is very high. For example, the revenue recognition method for AppDiscovery, which has the highest proportion, basically comes from the difference between the advertiser's budget and the publisher's demand price (generally, this difference accounts for 20% to 30% of the advertiser's total budget). The costs mainly consist of bandwidth server costs that can be amortized over many years. However, since Applovin's advertising intermediary service is not a C-end traffic platform that occupies a lot of bandwidth, we expect the actual advertising gross margin to reach over 90%.

On the other hand, as a high-growth company, Applovin does not overspend on operating expenses. Over the past three years, the company's overall Non-GAAP expense ratio has been in the range of 25% to 60%, but from the trend of changes, most of it should have been used for the development and operation of its own game apps, and the actual operating expense ratio for the advertising business should be around 15% to 30%.

In contrast, software companies like Unity have had sales expenses exceeding 20% during the period from 2021 to 2023, which may be the biggest difference from Applovin. After going public, Applovin quickly began to optimize profitability. Among them, the sales expenses, which are easiest to increase during the expansion process, were actually reduced by Applovin (also related to the closure of some game app operations). When revenue surged in the second half of 2023, sales expenses even had single-digit growth.

In the latest 3Q24 earnings call, management reiterated their expectation not to continue increasing investment in the sales team and emphasized that they have always hoped to impress advertisers through products rather than through sales persuasion.

2.3 Changes at Unity

The above criticism is more about the "crimes" of Unity's old team. The new team has been in office for three complete quarters, and we can see some positive signs of correction (1) First, it is about shedding low-margin businesses (such as professional consulting services, Luna, etc.). Although this results in a loss of about 20% of revenue, the focus will subsequently be on growth in a strategic combination centered around three core businesses: engines, advertising, and cloud.

(2) Secondly, it is about rapidly advancing the merger and integration of IronSource and Unity, which has been delayed for more than a year, especially simplifying redundant positions in the same business lines in terms of personnel. This is reflected in the contraction of the total employee size (a 25% reduction compared to the end of 2023), a decrease in the absolute value of operating expenses under Non-GAAP, and a simultaneous improvement in free cash flow.

(3) In addition, there is the optimization of equity incentive expenses. Starting from 2024, the absolute value of equity incentive expenses and their proportion of revenue will begin to decline quarter by quarter. Meanwhile, the overall number of newly granted options is also shrinking, and from the perspective of shareholder equity dilution growth, it has been significantly optimized compared to 2023 (seasonal fluctuations may come from a one-time increase due to the addition of new executives).

3. Valuation Calculation

Finally, let's calculate how much valuation space Unity has if we use Applovin as an anchor.

Unity's valuation is divided into two parts: engine business (Create) and advertising business (Growth). Only the advertising business can be compared to Applovin for valuation. Therefore, below, we focus on the calculation of the advertising business, with a slight adjustment for the engine business based on market expectations.

3.1 Is Applovin Overvalued?

Before calculating Unity's valuation, we need to address a question: Is Applovin currently overvalued? If the valuation is unreasonable, then using it as a valuation anchor will obviously lead us to overestimate Unity's potential space.

Compared to its advertising peers, the current market gives Applovin a relatively high valuation expectation. Based on 2025 performance, the EV/Sales ratio has reached 19x. Even though Applovin's EBITDA margin is relatively high, the EV/EBITDA ratio has also reached 35x, which basically exceeds the typical 10x-20x EV/EBITDA for digital advertising platforms and aligns with the valuation standards of high-growth software companies Such a high valuation stems from the company's management previously providing guidance for a software service (Software platform) to maintain a quarterly CAGR of 3-5% in the existing "game + tool application" sector (implying an annual growth of 15% to 20%). In recent quarters, Applovin has consistently exceeded expectations, naturally raising market expectations—beginning to penetrate some of Applovin's future e-commerce advertising market. However, in terms of proportion, revenue growth still mainly relies on games.

To eliminate the impact of the underperforming self-operated APP business, Dolphin will isolate the valuation of Applovin's software platform for further analysis:

(1) After the optimization of the self-operated game App product portfolio in 2024, the future revenue scale will likely remain stable under the company's subjective management (low profit margin, unwilling to take up too much proportion, but at the same time needing to maintain a certain number of 1P games as a supplement to user data). For a game business with an EBITDA profit margin of around 15% and zero growth, assuming an EV/EBITDA multiple of 15x, with 2025 EBITDA at 250 million, the valuation would be 3.8 billion.

(2) Subtracting the valuation of the aforementioned self-operated APP business from the current market value of 110 billion leaves 106.2 billion, compared to the 2025 EBITDA of 3.5 billion for the software platform business, resulting in an actual advertising portion valuation of EV/EBITDA = 30x.

Referring to Dolphin's expectations for the market size of in-app advertising revenue for games—CAGR of 14.6% from 2025 to 2027, under the trend of Applovin shrinking the industry chain to obtain higher shares (directly connecting buyers and sellers, eroding the shares of other SSPs and DSPs), it is not difficult for the App's software platform revenue to achieve a CAGR of over 20% in the next three years—Dolphin expects the software service revenue CAGR to reach 33% in the next three years, with the revenue expectation excluding e-commerce advertising at a CAGR of 28%.

Additionally, the Non-GAAP EBITDA profit margin for the advertising segment is also expected to rise from the current 75% to 80% and stabilize under strict control of marketing expenses, with the final profit CAGR growth expected to reach 46% (excluding e-commerce advertising expectations, EBITDA CAGR for the next three years is 30%).

Given that Applovin's software platform business is in such a high-growth phase, assigning a 2025 EV/EBITDA of 30x valuation is clearly not aggressive. Therefore, using the current Applovin as a valuation anchor for Unity Grow, which has "reversal expectations," is feasible.

3.2 How much can Unity Grow be worth optimistically?

Currently, Unity is stable at a market value of nearly 10 billion, which basically aligns with Dolphin's analysis in the《 [3Q24 Financial Report Review](https://longportapp.com/zh-CN/topics/25264137? The neutral valuation given in the invite-code is based on the rational valuation multiples under market sentiment, specifically summing up Create 7x EV/Sales and Grow 4x EV/Sales. Previously, due to continuous performance deterioration, the valuation was suppressed along with market sentiment.

However, the aforementioned valuation of 10 billion only includes expectations for Unity's two businesses to recover normally from a low base, especially to regain customers lost due to Run-time fees, as well as some incremental growth in Create business potentially brought by the price increase after the release of Unity 6. But for the Grow business, the expectation is merely to stabilize without further decline, meaning it does not include a real turnaround similar to Applovin in 2023.

Nevertheless, even if there are expectations for some reversal for Unity, based on the current situation and foreseeable trends, Unity's Grow valuation is expected to be discounted compared to Applovin. This stems from our previous analysis that Unity's ecosystem layout is not as strong as Applovin's, and there is still much work to be done in optimizing data conversion into models.

At the same time, we also mentioned that the new management team has shown significant improvements in shareholder interests and strategic decision-making compared to the old team. Therefore, in terms of execution capability, there is reason to expect a narrowing of the current gap. Currently, Unity has some unique advantages compared to Applovin before its turnaround:

(1) Industry & Environmental Advantages: On one hand, with the empowerment of new AI, there is hope to accelerate Unity's optimization of underlying recommendation models. On the other hand, the mobile game market is continuously warming up, at least not following the downward trend from 2021 to 2023.

(2) Company Advantages: After eliminating runtime fees and the release of Unity 6, the engine business remains a stable "customer acquisition channel" for the advertising business. Once this customer base returns, it can easily boost Grow revenue in a short period.

Therefore, based on Dolphin's overall perception, the current Unity resembles Applovin in 2020, when the industry chain integration and models had yet to be launched. However, Unity's advantages can somewhat shorten the overall reversal process.

Referring to Applovin's progress (starting in 2023), Unity Grow will not truly bear fruit until at least 2026, but this does not prevent Unity Grow from starting to bottom out in 2025, while Create drives the overall performance growth back.

If Unity's 2026 is like Applovin's 2023, then in the next 2-3 years, without considering external mergers and acquisitions to boost revenue, assuming it can achieve a 1-2 percentage point increase in market share similar to Applovin's exclusion of acquired company revenue from 2020 to 2023. Additionally, by 2027, it aims to fully accelerate recovery to a combined market share of 6% for Unity + ironsource in 2023 (though still some distance from the previous peak of 7.2%)

Of course, this is just a relatively similar hypothetical situation. Based on the changes in Grow's market share and Create's growth under different expectations, Unity's imagination space is as follows:

In summary, the current market has not completely given up on Unity, but rather carries a bit of cautious optimism. Although Unity's stock price recently surged 16% due to a post by the meme stock indicator "Roaring Kitty" on X that implied Unity's dynamics, it later fell back in the following days due to rising inflation concerns, following the trend of technology growth stocks.

However, Dolphin believes that the next two years will indeed be a key period for tracking Unity's reversal. Referring to the trends of Applovin over the past two years, the real betting opportunity for bullish funds requires at least two consecutive quarters of clear performance or operational effects. Moreover, Dolphin's judgment on the timing for Unity's version of Applovin may have to wait until 2026. Therefore, in the short term of at least 1-2 quarters, there is no need to be overly anxious about whether to get on board with Unity. Of course, if there are good opportunities to buy at lower prices, the closer it is to pessimistic expectations, the thicker the safety cushion can be.

Dolphin's previous reports on "Unity":

Earnings Season (Past Year)

November 9, 2024 Conference Call: Unity: Customer Relationships, Product Quality, and Execution (3Q24 Earnings Call)

November 9, 2024 Earnings Review: Soul Searching: Has Unity's "Bottom" Been Reached?

August 10, 2024 Conference Call: Unity: Discussing Goals Too Early, Execution is the Top Priority (2Q24 Conference Call Summary)

August 10, 2024 Earnings Review: Surge Without Reason, but "New" Unity is Promising May 10, 2024 Conference Call: Unity: Customer communication has improved, operational improvement in the second half of the year (1Q24 Conference Call Summary)

May 10, 2024 Earnings Report Review: Unity: Is the painful restructuring nearing its end?

February 27, 2024 Conference Call: Unity: Lightening the load, focusing on software

February 27, 2024 Earnings Report Review: Unity plummets? Poor management, terrible performance

November 10, 2023 Conference Call: Unity: More streamlined, more focused (Unity 3Q23 Conference Call Summary)

November 10, 2023 Earnings Report Review: Constantly chaotic operations, Unity weathering the storm

August 3, 2023 Conference Call: AI and VR will see significant progress in the next two years (Unity 2Q23 Earnings Conference Call Summary)

August 3, 2023 Earnings Report Review: Unity, repeatedly hyped, also delivers impressive performance

May 11, 2023 Earnings Report Review: Unity: Earnings report beat, taking off in Wuhu? Let's wait and see…

February 23, 2023 Conference Call: [Management: Currently in a recession period, focusing on the timing of recovery (Unity 4Q22 Conference Call Summary)](https://longportapp.com/en/topics/4305033? invite-code=032064)》

February 23, 2023 Financial Report Review: Unity: Strong Partnership with IronSource, Yet Hard to Resist Industry Winter?》

In-depth

October 12, 2022: The Winter of Gaming Has Arrived, Where Is the Warm Spring?》

April 1, 2022: Several Interesting Points in the "Unity 2022 Global Game Report"》

March 17, 2022: Can Valuation Be Boosted by the Imagination of the "Metaverse"? Unity Says It Can》

Risk disclosure and statement of this article: Dolphin Investment Research Disclaimer and General Disclosure