
Blackstone, BlackRock, and Apollo Face Successive Redemption Waves: The Inflection Point for the $3 Trillion Private Credit Market Has Arrived
Rising default rates have triggered a run on funds, prompting top firms such as Blackstone, BlackRock, and Apollo to impose redemption restrictions, leading to a liquidity crunch in the $3 trillion private credit market. With no secondary market for underlying loans, funds cannot quickly liquidate assets, intensifying redemption pressure in the second quarter. As assets are forced into discounted sales, long-term capital such as pension funds and insurance capital will face direct losses, while financing channels relied upon by AI data centers are simultaneously narrowing
Private credit, once regarded as one of the largest sources of incremental funding in the global financial system, is now facing its most severe test since its inception. As defaults rise, redemption waves erupt, and funds sequentially activate redemption restrictions, the private credit market, sized at $2.5 trillion to $3 trillion, is shifting from rapid expansion to risk clearance, with its impact beginning to transmit to commercial banks, AI financing, and capital markets.
Starting in the fourth quarter of last year, companies such as First Brands and Tri-Color Auto filed for bankruptcy one after another, putting continuous pressure on the credit quality of private credit portfolios. Since the beginning of this year, funds under several leading institutions, including BlackRock, Blackstone, Apollo, Cliffwater, and Blue Owl, have successively triggered redemption restrictions (gating), with redemption pressure further intensifying in the second quarter. Market participants believe that the private credit market has effectively stalled, with the industry gradually moving from "redemption restrictions" to "discounted asset disposals."
Meanwhile, PIMCO recently stated clearly that the global credit default cycle has begun, and future loss magnitudes may significantly exceed market expectations. As risks are gradually exposed, long-term capital such as pension funds, insurance capital, and high-net-worth investors will bear the brunt, while commercial bank lending and AI data center financing may also suffer knock-on effects.
From Bank Exit to Capital Frenzy: The Rapid Expansion of Private Credit
The private credit market was born in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis.
In the wake of the crisis, tighter regulations forced commercial banks to shrink their high-risk lending businesses, and non-bank financial institutions quickly filled this void. The direct lending market, represented by private credit funds and Business Development Companies (BDCs), rose rapidly, with funding mainly coming from pension funds, insurance companies, endowments, and high-net-worth investors.
Unlike publicly traded high-yield bonds, private credit loans are typically held to maturity, are not publicly traded, and do not require daily mark-to-market valuation. For borrowing companies, this means higher financing efficiency, more flexible terms, and greater confidentiality; for investors, it means achieving yields higher than those of public bonds, with smaller fluctuations in book value. However, this "low volatility" stems more from valuation mechanisms than from the nature of the risk itself.
Because assets are valued by the funds themselves and lack public market prices, credit deterioration often does not immediately reflect in net asset values. Meanwhile, a large number of higher-risk borrowers have gradually exited the public bond market, causing the overall credit quality of public junk bonds to actually improve.
In recent years, the scope of private credit business has also continuously expanded, extending from mid-sized enterprises with annual revenues of $10 million to $1 billion to large-scale M&A financing and AI infrastructure construction. Last November, Morgan Stanley predicted that up to half of the approximately $1.5 trillion in external financing demand for AI data centers in the future could come from the private credit market.
Fee-Driven Capital Rush: Credit Standards Begin to Loosen
Behind the industry's explosive growth lies a highly attractive profit model.
Composite fees for private credit funds typically reach 3%-4% of net assets, which, although lower than those of private equity funds, are far higher than traditional fixed-income products. This model has attracted a rush of Wall Street institutions to establish positions, driving continuous capital inflows.
Market estimates suggest that between 2024 and 2025, the industry's assets under management grew by approximately 50%-75%, reaching an overall scale of $2.5 trillion to $3 trillion. During the same period, a significant portion of the incremental new commercial credit in the United States actually flowed to these non-bank lending institutions.
However, capital growth has far outpaced the growth rate of high-quality borrowers.
As competition intensifies, lenders have had to accept borrowers with weaker credit quality and looser loan covenants to maintain lending speeds. The proportion of "covenant-lite" loans continues to rise, accumulating overall industry risk, a problem that only gradually came to light as defaults began to increase.
Redemption Wave Erupts: Market Liquidity Begins to Freeze
As default rates rise, the biggest structural weakness of the private credit market has been exposed.
Due to the lack of a public trading market for underlying loans, funds cannot quickly sell assets to meet redemption demands like public bond funds. When the redemption ratio reaches a preset threshold, funds can only activate redemption restriction clauses, limiting investors' ability to withdraw funds.
Since the beginning of this year, products under large institutions such as BlackRock, Blackstone, Apollo, Cliffwater, and Blue Owl have sequentially activated these mechanisms, with redemption pressure rising further in the second quarter. Market participants believe that the private credit market has effectively entered a "frozen" state.
Although there are still small amounts of new loans in the market, overall trading activity has significantly shrunk. Once redemptions continue to expand, some funds may have to sell loan assets below book value, and the industry will formally enter a phase of price revaluation.
Compared to the public bond market, the bigger issue lies in transparency. External investors currently have almost no way to accurately judge the fund's true default rate, the scale of asset impairments, and the final recovery rate, and can only observe continuing capital outflows and escalating liquidity pressure.
Risks Begin to Transmit to the Banking System and AI Financing
Private credit does not operate in isolation; it relies heavily on the banking system for liquidity support.
Currently, banks provide substantial leveraged funding to private credit funds through subscription line financing, Net Asset Value (NAV) Financing, and revolving credit facilities. Data shows that banks' contingent liquidity exposure to Non-Deposit Financial Institutions (NDFIs) is approximately $2.3 trillion, with the share attributable to private credit having continuously increased in recent years.
If the private credit industry enters a phase of concentrated defaults and sustained redemptions, banks may face greater demands for liquidity support and further tighten overall credit issuance. This does not necessarily imply a systemic financial crisis, but consumer loans, corporate loans, and real estate financing could all be affected.
Another potential shock comes from AI infrastructure financing. Previously, the market generally expected that private credit would account for about half of the external financing demand for AI data centers. However, as capital continues to flow out and market liquidity freezes, this financing channel has significantly contracted in the short term.
Given that AI-related companies currently account for approximately 45% of the total market capitalization of the S&P 500 Index, if AI capital expenditure slows down due to financing obstacles, the related impact may further transmit to the overall valuation of the US stock market.
PIMCO: The Default Cycle Has Already Begun
Fixed-income giant PIMCO recently stated clearly that the global credit default cycle has begun, and future loss magnitudes may be significantly higher than widely market expectations.
For private credit, this means that the development logic built over the past decade or so, relying on a loose financing environment and low default rates, is changing. Those ultimately bearing the losses will mainly be pension funds, insurance capital, asset management institutions, and high-net-worth investors, while a large number of loans still use model-based valuations, meaning actual losses have not yet been fully reflected on the books.
Market participants believe that private credit is undergoing its first true test of a credit cycle since its inception.
As defaults, redemptions, and asset discounts form a mutually reinforcing negative feedback loop, the credit cycle that previously drove the industry's rapid expansion is reversing. Whether this adjustment, starting in the private credit market, will further transmit to the banking system, the AI investment cycle, and even the stock market, may become one of the most noteworthy risk variables in global financial markets in the second half of the year.
